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WHEN "SEX" SELLS: EXPANDING THE TORT OF
CONVERSION TO ENCOMPASS DOMAIN NAMES
I. INTRODUCTION
When someone forgets the street that his favorite Italian restaurant is
on, all he has to do is flip open the phonebook. Immediately at his
fingertips is the restaurant's phone number and address. Equipped with
this information, he can drive over to the precise location and indulge in the
meal about which he dreamt.
What if once he arrived there the restaurant was gone? In its place
stands an entirely different-looking Mexican restaurant. In fact, if not for
the address on the facade he would have driven right by, finding the new
restaurant unrecognizable--different architecture, different owners, and
completely different cuisine. The original owner screams on the sidewalk
that the new owners have transformed his property without his consent
while he was on vacation. The realtor tries to calm him by explaining that
the new owners provided her with documents showing the original owner
transferred his rights.
On October 15, 1995, this exact scenario occurred, not on a city
street, but instead on the information superhighway.1  Gary Kremen's
potential female advice site,2 intended to provide information pertaining to
sexually transmitted diseases, underage pregnancy, and health,3 was
developed instead by Stephen Cohen into a site dedicated to pornography.4
Although Kremen registered the domain name "sex.com" with the proper
authorities on May 9, 1994, Cohen managed to transfer the name for his
own use via a fraudulent letter.5 While Kremen did subsequently bring suit
and reacquire the rights to the domain name, Judge James Ware of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California refused
1. See Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
2. John Roemer, Web Domain Name Not Protected by Property Laws, US. Judge Rules,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Dec. 15, 2000, at 1.
3. Cohen v. Carreon, No. CV-00-235-ST, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7746, at *2 (D. Or. Mar.
9,2001).
4. See Sex. com Site Awarded to Its Founder, 7 THE INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 4, Jan. 2001,
LEXIS, News & Business, News, News Group Files, All [hereinafter Sex com Site Awarded].
5. See Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1170.
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to extend the tort of conversion to encompass domain names.6 Thus,
property continued to break its tangible bounds via the new era of the
Internet, but tort law did not.
This Comment will examine the development of Internet domain
names and their place in American property jurisprudence. In addition, it
will discuss the origins of the tort of conversion, as well as the seemingly
stagnant state of the doctrine. Furthermore, this Comment will address
conversion as applied to domain name disputes and explore a possible
resolution. Part II lays a foundation by providing a basic background
description of domain name components using the background facts of
Kremen v. Cohen7 to illustrate the type of dispute that arises with domain
names. Part III traces the tort of conversion from its origins, through its
expansion, to its current stagnant condition. The conversion doctrine and
the Internet finally cross paths in Part IV in an analysis of the legal opinion
generated in Kremen. In an attempt to plausibly expand the modem
doctrine, despite the Kremen court's unwillingness to do so, Part V
analogizes and distinguishes domain names from other intangible property
in the case law. Finally, Part VI concludes that the holding in Kremen was
incorrect because the doctrine of conversion must recognize domain names
as property in order to protect the future of business on the Internet.
II. BACKGROUND DEVELOPMENT OF DOMAIN NAMES AND DISPUTES OVER
THEM
A. What's in a Domain Name?
A domain name begins "as an Internet Protocol (IP) address"8
consisting of four sequences of numbers separated by periods.9 Because an
IP address is typically complicated to remember, it is subsequently replaced
by a domain name such as yahoo.com.
10
Using yahoo.com as an example, this domain name can be broken
down into three components. "Yahoo" would be the second-level domain
6. See Shannon Lafferty, Fighting over Money and Sex (dot corn), THE RECORDER, Jan. 31,
2001, News at 2, LEXIS, News & Business, News, News Group File, All.
7. 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.
8. Neil Batavia, Comment, That Which We Call a Domain by Any Other Name Would Smell
as Sweet: The Overbroad Protection of Trademark Law as It Applies to Domain Names on the
Internet, 53 S.C. L. REv. 461, 463 (2002); see also Kenton K. Yee, Location.Location.Location:
Internet Addresses as Evolving Property, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 201, 204-05 (1997).
9. See Batavia, supra note 8, at 463.
10. Id.
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(SLD), "." would be the root, and "corn" would be the top-level domain
(TLD)." The Domain Name Service then organizes the components so
that any computer user can retrieve any registered domain name.
12
Originally, in order to register it with an organization such as Network
Solutions, Inc., the domain name only had to be previously unregistered
and unique.
3
Because the original requirements to register were lax, disputes
pertaining to domain names ensued. Few potential registrants examined
whether their name "would infringe any preexisting trademark" before
racing to register it.14  The most infamous dispute developed when an
individual registered the domain name MCDONALDS.COM.15 Obviously,
McDonald's Corp. felt this name was extremely valuable to its corporate
development. However, in order to obtain the rights to the domain name,
McDonald's Corp. was forced to make a charitable contribution to the
individual who registered it first.'
6
A similar dispute arose when a former employee of MTV Networks
registered the domain name MTV.COM.17 The employee then created a
website offering music news and information in a similar manner to MTV
Networks services. 18 Ultimately, MTV Networks recovered the domain
name after a settlement agreement between the two parties. ' 9
The simple registration process led to various domain name
11. Id.
12. See id at 463-64. The Domain Name Service is a hierarchical retrieval system by
which complex domain names are organized into a branching pattern of simpler components.
Initially, there was no other respected and regularly utilized manner of organization. Network
Solutions then places its registrants' domain names in this system. Id. at 464-65..
13. See id. at 464-65. Network Solutions was the only registrar of domain names in the
United States until approximately 1999. Any registrant seeking to register his domain name had
to use the Network Solutions root server in order for his website to be viewable on Internet
browsers. Thus, Network Solutions was the sole body responsible for governing the domain
name process via rules and regulations. Id. at 465.
14. Bruce P. Keller, Trademark and Unfair Competition Issues, in PROTECTING YOUR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETs 257, 309 (PLI Intell. Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G-
568, 1999).
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. Id. This dispute arose in the case of MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202, 203-04
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). Adam Curry, a former MTV employee, registered MTV.COM as a domain
name. He developed the site at his own expense and under the pretense that MTV supported his
development of the site. However, MTV later sued Curry, claiming that it did not agree that he
could create the site using MTV's name. Curry, on the other hand, alleged that MTV was merely
using him to test the waters for its own future Internet project. Id.
18. ATVNetworks, 867 F. Supp. 203-04.
19. Keller, supra note 14, at 309.
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infringement problems. In response, Internic, the Internet Network
Information Center, created the Domain Name Dispute Policy.2 0 Under its
policy the registration guidelines provided:
To register a domain name with Internic under this Policy, a
potential registrant must: (i) select a suitable name not already
registered by somebody else; (ii) arrange to have two
operational computers-a main one and a backup-actively
connected to the Internet to "host" or answer to the domain
name; (iii) pay Internic an annual fee of $50, the first two years
($100) due at registration; and (iv) sign a Domain Name Dispute
Policy agreement with Internic .... z
The annual fee described above varies depending on the commercial
registration service one utilizes. 22 For example, a low cost provider would
charge a $60 setup fee and $30 monthly service charge, while a high cost
provider would offer registration in all the industrialized countries for a
charge of $7,000.23 In addition, any violation of the policy could lead to
the deregistration of the violator's domain name.2 4  This deregistration
would in turn mean that any new applicant could register the cancelled
domain name as his own.
Despite this policy, the rise of both the Internet and e-commerce
compelled individuals from around the world to register domain names.25
Businessmen sought to take advantage of this untapped consumer resource.
However, while the number of permutations of letters to form words in the
English language is unimaginable, entrepreneurs only covet the most
recognizable and generic words.2 6  For example, the ease at which a
consumer could track down a name such as dog.com in order to find dog
information makes this domain name far more attractive than xzybn.com
providing the same information.
Also, some of the methods employed to satisfy demand for a specific
word only confused the situation further.27 The distinction between dog.net
20. See Yee, supra note 8, at 206. The registrar for geographical TLDs is known as the
Internet Information Center, or Internic. Lisa Katz Jones, Trademark.corn: Trademark Law in
Cyberspace, 37 ALTA. L. REV. 991, 995 (1999). In the United States, Network Solutions has a
contract with the National Science Foundation to operate Internic. Id
21. See Yee, supra note 8, at 206.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Keller, supra note 14, at 311.
25. Yee, supra note 8, at 206.
26. See generally id. at 207-08 (listing examples that demonstrate the popularity of
common words as domain names).
27. See Keller, supra note 14, at 319.
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and dog.com would rarely come to the mind of the average computer user,
let alone distinguish the two as different website entrances.28 Some
businesses were capable of compromise. Wired Magazine managed to
convince Women's Wire to change its domain name from wire.net to
29wwire.net. Some unwilling to compromise resorted to intentional theft of
domain names by committing fraud.30  The question soon arose-how
would the legal system remedy these situations?
B. Everybody Wants "Sex: " The Dispute over the
Domain Name Sex.com
On May 9, 1994, Gary Kremen, representing Online Classified, Inc.,
registered sex.com as a domain name for the first time.31  Network
Solutions, Inc. granted the domain name to Kremen, as there was neither a
prior nor conflicting registrant.32 Kremen's intent for this domain name
was to link those interested to an informative website discussing "sexually
transmitted disease education, underage pregnancy, and women's health. 33
However, before Kremen could create the website content, Stephen Cohen
obtained the rights over the domain name and began constructing adult-
themed businesses.34
Realizing the possible value of sex.com, Cohen sent a forged letter to
Network Solutions stating that Online Classified, Inc. was relinquishing
sex.com and all rights therein.35 The letter, however, was not signed by
Cohen, but by Sharon Dimmick, the alleged president of Online Classified,
Inc. 36 Assuming that both the signature and company letterhead on which
the letter was written were authentic, Network Solutions made the domain
name available once again for registration.37 Cohen immediately used this
opportunity to register the domain name under his own company.
38
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. See generally Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(discussing the alleged fraud Stephen Cohen committed when he forged the signature of a
representative from Gary Kremen's company on a letter and sent it to Network Solutions).
31. Id. at 1170.
32. See Batavia, supra note 8, at 464-65. (discussing the process of registering a domain
name with Network Solutions, Inc.).
33. Cohen v. Carreon, No. CV-00-235-ST, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7746, at *2 (D. Or. Mar.
9,2001).
34. Id. at *3-*4.
35. Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1170.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
20031
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Kremen subsequently received notice from Network Solutions that it had
cancelled his registration.39 After investigating the matter and concluding
that Cohen's letter was a forgery, Kremen brought suit against multiple
defendants, including Network Solutions and Stephen Cohen.40
Specifically, Kremen alleged both "conspiracy to convert property
and.., conversion of bailee" against Network Solutions.41 Unfortunately
for Kremen, Judge Ware dismissed both causes of action pursuant to
Network Solutions' motion for summary judgment.42
III. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORT OF CONVERSION
A. The Historical Development of Conversion
The tort of conversion arose out the common law's writ of trover.43
"Trover" is the French word for "finding." 44 Essentially, the courts created
conversion to cover instances where trespass to chattels and detinue failed
to compensate the plaintiff.45 First, trespass to chattels was inapplicable to
the finding of lost goods.4 6 Thus, trespass required that the tortfeasor take
the goods of another without consent.47 Second, detinue was inappropriate
for the situation of found goods.48 Detinue required an agreement between
the two parties, which created a bailment relationship.49
As a result, individuals were now able to employ trover to recover
their goods. Specifically, one was now able to argue that the tortfeasor
found his lost good and refused to return it upon request. 50 The claimant
only needed to prove that he had a superior title to the tortfeasor.51
Eventually, courts no longer limited the tort to instances of lost and found
goods.52 Reaching its modern form of conversion, trover only required that
39. Cohen, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7746, at *4.
40. See Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1170.
41. Id. at 1170-71.
42. Id. at 1174-75.
43. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 1.12.2 (1st ed. 1999).
44. Id.
45. See id. Trespass to chattels is the intentional dispossession of, use of, or intermeddling
with the chattel of another. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965).
46. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43.
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the tortfeasor "treated someone else's property as his own, regardless of
how he came by it.""
B. The Modern Black Letter Law: Elements of Conversion
The Restatement of Torts defines conversion as "an intentional
exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes
with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to
pay the other full value of the chattel. 54 Black's Law Dictionary defines
conversion as:
The act of changing from one form to another; the process of
being exchanged... The wrongful possession or disposition of
another's property as if it were one's own; an act or series of
acts of willful interference, without lawful justification, with an
item of property in a manner inconsistent with another's right,
whereby that other person is deprived of the use and possession
of the property."
Inherent in this definition are individual elements: intent, act, and
possession or ownership.56
Conversion requires the intent to claim an ownership in the goods.57
However, one committing the tort need neither have bad intentions nor
intentions of taking property from another.5 8 Rather, tort law classifies
conversion as a strict liability tort.59 Therefore, a tortfeasor's good faith
belief that he owns a piece of property is wholly irrelevant to the intent
element of conversion.60 Simply put, a tortfeasor intends to convert a piece
of property if his possession or "claim of ownership is inconsistent with the
original owner' S.,6 1  As such, intent often requires little more than a
showing of the original owner's possession or right of ownership and the
act of depriving the owner of that right.62
The act element of the tort must be "some affirmative claim of
ownership ... or some act inconsistent with [the original owner's] title.,
63
53. Id.
54. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, § 1.12.1.
55. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 144 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).
56. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, § 1.12.1.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. See Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
63. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, § 1.12.1.
2003]
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Some courts refer to it as a wrongful act or a disposition of a property
interest. 64  Either way, the act requirement ensures that one's negligent
destruction of another's property will not result in conversion. 65  The
tortfeasor must represent himself as would a reasonable owner or as a
possessor of the property.
66
Finally, the original owner must prove that he had the right of
ownership or possession over the property. 67 The owner or possessor can
establish this element in a variety of ways.68 For example, the owner could
provide a receipt or deed as evidence. In addition, the mere location of the
item on the alleged owner's property could suffice. 6 9  Furthermore, the
owner must not have previously relinquished possession or ownership or
consented to the tortfeasor's possession of the property. y
One of the earliest actions for conversion best demonstrates the
elements of the tort. In Maye v. Yappen, the California Supreme Court set
forth the strict liability nature of conversion. 71 There, the plaintiffs and
defendants owned adjoining mines.72 The defendants crossed onto the
plaintiffs' land and mined a portion of that land.73
The defendants argued that they were not liable for mining the
plaintiffs' gold because they neither maliciously nor intentionally
committed the act.74 According to the defendants, the plaintiffs allowed
them to continue mining because they were nowhere near the dividing
line.75 Relying on the plaintiffs' statement, the defendants continued
mining in good faith ignorance of the actual division.76 However, a later
survey by the defendants' surveyor revealed that the defendants had
crossed the line.7 7 The defendants asserted estoppel based on the plaintiffs'
assurances of the property line. 78 The California Supreme Court rejected
64. Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1172.
65. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, § 1.12.1.
66. See id.
67. See Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1172.
68. See id.
69. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 43, § 1.12.1 (discussing the facts of Maye v. Yappen,
23 Cal. 306 (1863), where trees on the owner's land were converted when a neighbor cut them
down in good faith).
70. See Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1172 (establishing the elements of conversion).
71. See Maye, 23 Cal. at 307-08.
72. Id. at 307.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Maye, 23 Cal. at 308.
78. Id.
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this argument.7 9  It found instead that both parties were ignorant of the
actual dividing line. 0 Due to these findings, the court determined that two
of the jury instructions given at trial were erroneous.81  They were as
follows:
If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendants were
ignorant of the boundary lines between the plaintiffs and
defendants, and in such ignorance, if they entered upon the
ground of the plaintiffs in good faith, believing it to be their
own, and were induced to do so by the acts and representations
of plaintiffs themselves, then they will find for the
defendants.... If the jury believe, from the testimony, that
defendants entered upon plaintiffs' ground in good faith,
believing it to be their own ground, and were misled into so
doing by the acts or declarations of plaintiffs, then if the
plaintiffs recover at all, they can only recover the net sums taken
from plaintiffs' ground, over and above the expense of
extracting it.
8 2
As a result, the court held that, even if the defendants' mining were
accidental, they were still liable for conversion.8 3 Additionally, the court
required the defendants to pay the plaintiffs' damages equivalent to "the
value of the gold-bearing earth at the time it was separated from the
surrounding soil and became a chattel. 84
Because of the precise measurements of gold that the plaintiffs
presented as evidence at trial, Maye v. Yappen was an easy case for the
newly-developed doctrine of conversion.8 ' The gold and soil were both
tangible.86 There existed a precise market value for both types of
property.87 However, how would the legal system apply this precedent to
intangible property?
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 312.
82. Id. at 309-10.
83. See Maye, 23 Cal. at 308.
84. Id. at 311.
85. See id..
86. See id. at 310.
87. See id. at 310-11.
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C. The Tort of Conversion as Applied to Intangible Property
Historically, the tort of conversion did not include "wrongful
interference with intangible personal property." 88 However, with the ever-
growing importance of and dependence on intangible property, such as
stocks and bonds, the law began to recognize a cause of action for
conversion of specific types of this property.8 9 This modem recognition
comes with an incredibly clear-cut limitation. In order for a court to
entertain an argument for conversion, the intangible property must be
"merged with, or reflected in, something tangible." 90
Take for example a savings account. 9' The account itself is
intangible. It is comprised of nothing more than numbers. Nevertheless,
because this account is memorialized in a bank passbook, it can be the
subject of a claim for conversion. 92 There is a tangible representation of
the existence of the account in the black ink dollar figure on the passbook
page.
The same, though, is not true for many other valuable pieces of
intangible property. Thus far courts have been unwilling to allow an action
for conversion to lie in regards to the "goodwill of a business, trade secrets,
or a newspaper or laundry route.' '93 The judicial standard of a tangible
representation of the intangible property seems unforgiving. Some argue
that the reluctance of the courts to recognize that conversion can
encompass other intangible property is inappropriate.9 4  One author
suggested that "where ideas are formulated with labor and inventive genius,
as in the case of literary works or scientific researches, they are protected.
Where they constitute instruments of fair and effective commercial
competition, those who develop them may gather their fruits under the
protection of the law. 95 Nevertheless, no court had entertained a cause of
action for conversion where the property at issue was a domain name.
Despite the odds, the owner of a domain name would again battle for the
expansion of the tort in Kremen.
96
88. 14 CAL. JUR. 3D Conversion § 12 (2002).
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW § 2:13 (2002).
95. Id.
96. See Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1170.
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IV. LEGAL TREATMENT OF KREMEN V. COHEN97
Returning to the facts of Kremen, plaintiff Gary Kremen alleged
multiple causes of action against defendant Network Solutions.
98
Conversion was one of these causes of action.99  Claiming Network
Solutions committed this tort, Kremen argued that as the registrar of the
domain name "sex.com," Network Solutions "wrongfully assigned the
property rights to Sex.com to [co-defendant Stephen] Cohen."100 Network
Solutions, on the other hand, defended against the claim arguing that "a
domain name ... is a form of intangible property that cannot be the basis of
a conversion claim." 10' As such, Network Solutions moved for summary
judgment on all six causes of action, including conversion.0 2
The court began its analysis of conversion by setting forth its
elements. 10 3 Under California law, Kremen, the plaintiff, was required to
prove the following: first, that he had either ownership or right to
possession of the property at the time of the alleged conversion; second,
that Network Solutions' conversion was by a wrongful act or disposition of
property rights; and finally, damages. 10 4  Following a black letter legal
introduction, the court discussed the manner by which California
jurisprudence dealt with conversion. 105
The history of tort law reveals that conversion generally only applies
106to the wrongful act or disposition of property rights in tangible property.
97. Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
98. Id. at 1170-71.
99. Id. at 1171.
100. Roemer, supra note 2, at 4.
101. Id.
102. Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1170. The six causes of action were breach of contract,
breach of intended third-party beneficiary contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent
misrepresentation, conspiracy to convert property, and conversion of bailee. Id. at 1170-71. The
breach of contract cause of action failed because Kremen could not prove the existence of a
contract. Id. at 1172. The breach of intended third-party beneficiary contract cause of action
failed because Kremen did not tender sufficient evidence to create an issue of triable fact
pertaining to third-party beneficiary status granted under the Cooperative Agreement. Id. The
breach of fiduciary duty cause of action failed because the relationship between Network
Solutions and Kremen was so remote that there was no fiduciary duty of trust and confidence. Id.
at 1175. The negligent misrepresentation cause of action failed because Kremen did not offer any
evidence of a misrepresentation. Id. Finally, the conversion of bailee cause of action failed
because the registration of domain names does not make Network Solutions a bailee. Kremen, 99
F. Supp. At 1175.
103. Id. at 1172.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 1172-73.
106. Id. at 1172.
2003]
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However, the Kremen court did note that, in limited circumstances,
California jurisprudence had expanded the tort to include intangible
property. 10 7 Specifically, any intangible property alleged to be converted
must have been "represented by documents, such as a [sic] bonds, notes,
bills of exchange, stock certificates, and warehouse receipts. 10 8 However,
California courts have declined to consider "[i]ntangible property such as
'goodwill of business, trade secrets, a newspaper route, or a laundry list of
customers .. ,,,109
Having laid the groundwork for its analysis, the court entertained
Network Solutions' argument that a domain name is insufficient intangible
property to be the basis for a conversion claim. 01 Judge Ware followed
current California law precisely: he wasted no time deciding that there was
"simply no evidence establishing that a domain name, including sex.com,
[was] 'merged in or identified with' a document or other tangible
object.""' Falling outside previous acceptable intangible property like
bonds and notes, the domain would not suffice as property to sustain an
action for conversion. 1
2
Ware examined two cases in deciding that the domain name was
insufficient intangible property." 3 First, he examined Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.114 In that case, Lockheed Martin sued
Network Solutions for trademark infringement of the service mark "Skunk
Works.""' 5  "Skunk Works" was Lockheed Martin's aircraft design and
construction laboratory." 6  Lockheed Martin argued that Network
Solutions allowed others to register variations of the phrase "Skunk
Works," such as skunkworks.net and theskunkworks.com. 1 7 Lockheed
Martin claimed that these third-party domain names both diluted and
infringed its domain name." 8 However, Network Solutions was not found
liable. 119 The Ninth Circuit reached this holding by determining that
Network Solutions did not provide a product, but instead provided a
107. Id. at 1172-73.
108. Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1172.
109. Id. (quoting 5 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 613 (9th ed. 1988)).
110. Id. at 1173.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 1173 n.2.
114. 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
115. Id. at 980.
116. Id. at 982.
117. Id. at 983.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 987.
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service. 20 The Kremen court distinguished the "sex.com" dispute based on
this holding. 12' Lockheed Martin was inapplicable because it was
concerned with Network Solutions' "role, rather than the proper
classification of a domain name."
'
1
2
Second, Ware addressed the case of Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro
International, Inc. 2 3 That matter was a garnishment proceeding in which a
creditor sought to garnish multiple domain names from a debtor.
24
However, the Virginia Supreme Court held in the debtor's favor because
domain names were not garnishable. 25  The Virginia Supreme Court
reached this holding because the right to use a given domain name "is
inextricably bound to the domain name services that [Network Solutions]
provides."'
126
Despite the holding of Umbro International, the Kremen court clearly
felt the two cases could be distinguished. 27  Judge Ware felt that the
specifics of a garnishment proceeding were far different from a conversion
action.128 In addition, the domain names in Umbro International were
registered pursuant to a contract with Network Solutions, unlike the domain
names at issue in Kremen.129 Furthermore, Ware agreed with the dissent in
Umbro International, which stated that "the right to use domain names
'exists separate and apart from [Network Solutions'] various services that
make the domain names operational Internet addresses."",
130
After discussing case law relied on by both parties, Ware addressed
three policy concerns regarding his reluctance to expand the tort of
conversion to encompass Internet domain names. 3 1 First, tort law
characterizes conversion as a strict liability tort.'3 2 As a strict liability tort,
the alleged tortfeasor's intent and knowledge are irrelevant for finding
liability.133 Strict liability was far too severe in the Court's opinion. 34 If
120. Lockheed Martin, 194 F.3d at 984-85.
121. Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1173 n.2.
122. Id.
123. See id.; 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000).
124. Umbro Int'l, 529 S.E.2d at 80.
125. Id. at 86.
126. Id.
127. See Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1173 n.2.
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 1173.
132. Id.
133. Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1173.
134. See id. at 1174.
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conversion covered domain names, Network Solutions and all other
domain name registrars would be vulnerable to suit "every time a third
party fraudulently obtained the transfer of a domain name."'' 35  Ware
believed that the repercussions of such prospective liability would be a
multitude of regulations and fee increases. 36  In addition, these
repercussions might impede the entire process of domain name
registration. 1
37
Second, Ware felt that expansion of the law of conversion would
result in a "slippery slope.' 38  In other words, Ware did not want to
remove the entire concept of tangibility from the requirements of
conversion. 139  He would rather force plaintiffs like Kremen to seek
alternative remedies to protect their domain names. 140  However, the
opinion did not mention any of these remedies until its final policy
concern. 141
Finally, the court further discussed the notion that other remedies
were better fashioned for the domain name dispute. 142 However, the court
did not specify these remedies, leaving those matters for future
consideration by Congress. 14 3 Following the court's discussion of this
policy concern, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Network
Solutions for the conversion cause of action. 1
44
V. DIFFERENT "SEX" POSITIONS: EXPANDING THE TORT OF CONVERSION
BASED ON AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Intangible Bundle of Rights for Intangible Property
The Kremen court's reasoning in considering the expansion of the tort
of conversion was faulty. The initial step in expanding the tort of
conversion to encompass domain names is determining that a domain name
is property. Property was originally-and still is sometimes narrowly-
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
140. See id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 15
(5th ed. 1984)).
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
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conceptualized as a "fixed, tangible object."' 145  The common law
developed the notion of property as a "bundle of rights."'' 46 This notion
suggests that a domain name could be considered property "because a
holder [of the domain name in question] has the right to use it, exclude
others from using it, and transfer it to another entity."' 147 Thus, the rights a
holder has in a domain name equate with the rights a business has in an
advertising sign.
148
The use, sale, and transfer of domain names already occur in
practice. 49  Use, which is the backbone of this Comment, is the
"application ... employment [or enjoyment] of something."'150 Regarding
transfer, Network Solutions specifically "requires the domain name holder
to complete a Registrant Name Change Agreement." 151 Finally, although
no domain name has officially been sold yet, many are currently being
advertised for sale by registrants.1
52
Although the Kremen court was unwilling to adopt this view,
precedent suggested that domain names are property as well. The matter of
Umbro International espoused this very conclusion.153  There, Umbro
International argued that the domain name is a form of property because
Network Solutions provides a registrant with ". . the exclusive right to use a
unique domain name for a specified period of time." 154 Network Solutions,
on the other hand, contended that a registrant is only entitled to the
exclusive right to use the domain name as a translation of the Internet
Provider (IP) address for Internet surfers. 55  Network Solutions
characterized the right as contractual; therefore, a domain name was not
property. 156  Unfortunately, Judge Kinser had a better memory than
Network Solutions. He reminded them that they had conceded during oral
argument "that the right to use a domain name is a form of intangible
personal property."' 57  Ultimately, the court did determine that the
145. A. Mechele Dickerson, From Jeans to Genes: The Evolving Nature of Property of the
Estate, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 285, 304 (1998).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., id. at 303.
150. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1540 (7th ed. 1999).
151. Dickerson, supra note 145, at 303.
152. Id. at 306.
153. Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86 (Va. 2000).
154. Id.
155. See id. at 85.
156. See id.
157. Id. at 86.
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registrant's right was more related to a contractual service.1 58 However,
this determination was strictly contingent upon the court's interpretation of
the requirements of a specific Virginia garnishment law (not conversion).
159
This specificity avoided characterizing domain names as a type of property,
and diminished Network Solutions' concession pertaining to such.
160
B. Conversion of Intellectual Property Precedent
Exploration of precedent dealing with the conversion of intellectual
property further exemplifies why the Kremen court wrongly decided not to
expand the tort of conversion to encompass domain names. The Nebraska
Court of Appeals in the case of Mundy v. Decker first recognized that these
cases involved "an old remedy, conversion, and a new factual situation
possible only in the computer era."' 6 1 In Mundy, a former secretary deleted
the entire contents of her employer's Word Perfect directory contained on
an office computer hard drive. 162 The secretary intentionally destroyed the
files on her last day of work before she was fired. 163 The Nebraska Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's verdict, believing that
the employer had stated a claim for conversion. 164
The facts of Mundy, which are strikingly similar to the facts of
Kremen, clearly support the extension of conversion to domain names. In
Mundy, the secretary destroyed the Word Perfect version of her employer's
documents. 65 Although the documents had been saved onto floppy disks
as well as produced as multiple hard copies, the Nebraska Court of Appeals
recognized the essential efficiency that the Word Perfect form provided.
166
Like a domain name, a Word Perfect form of a document allows quick and
easy retrieval of information stored on the computer.' 67 The Nebraska
Court of Appeals stated that the existence of tangible forms of the
documents was "meaningless on the question of whether there had been a
conversion of the directory's files."'168 The only concern was that the
158. See id.
159. See Umbro Intl, 529 S.E.2d at 86.
160. See id at 88.
161. Mundy v. Decker, No. A-97-882, 1999 Neb. App. LEXIS 3, at *1 (Neb. Ct. App. Jan.
5, 1999).
162. Id. at *10.
163. Id. at *3.
164. Id. at *18.
165. Id. at *3.
166. Id. at *2-*4.
167. Mundy, 1999 Neb. App. LEXIS 3, at *2-*3.
168. Id. at *14.
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secretary altered the employer's property, just as Cohen did to Kremen's
property, thus, exercising "dominion over it."'
169
One California court expressed greater concern for the intangible
property of information than it did for the tangible property that housed it
in Ananda Church of Self-Realization v. Massachusetts Bay Insurance
Co.170 There, the defendant removed "documents from the trash can of the
claimant's attorney" that pertained to suits in which the plaintiff was
involved, seeking indemnification from the defendants.' 7 1 Subsequently,
the plaintiff brought an action for conversion.'7 2  The court denied the
conversion claim because "[b]y placing [the documents] into the garbage,
the owner renounces the key incidents of ownership-title, possession, and
the right to control."'
' 73
Separately, the court examined a specific property damage provision
of the insurance policy that Massachusetts Bay Insurance Co. provided to
the Ananda Church of Self-Realization. 174 This provision led the court to
find that the loss of the documents did not satisfy the policy's requirements
to hold the defendant liable for conversion. 175 Of particular interest, the
court stated that the true value of the property was the ability to exploit the
information within the documents. 176 Thus, the tangibility requirement of
conversion hinged on the specific insurance policy term, not the specific
characteristics of the documents or the information contained within
them. 1
77
The alleged conversion of a telephone number is probably most
similar to that of a domain name. A court considered this very situation in
the case of Rotstein v. Cable & Wireless, Inc.'78  There, the defendant
company provided the plaintiff consumer with telephone numbers for his
own personal and business uses. 179  Subsequently, the plaintiff began
working at a job where his employer agreed to pay the plaintiff's business-
related phone bills that were sent directly to the defendant.'
8 0
Unfortunately, shortly after a year at his new job, the plaintiffs services
169. Id. at *10.
170. 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
171. Id. at 372.
172. See id. at 370.
173. Id. at 376.
174. See id. at 377-78.
175. Seeid. at 378.
176. See Ananda, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378.
177. Id.
178. No. G027549, 2002 WL 691458, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002) (unpublished).
179. Id.
180. Id.
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were no longer required.181
Although the plaintiff no longer worked at the job location, the
defendant continued to direct the plaintiffs calls to the company's
corporate offices. 182 The defendant persisted in this conduct despite the
plaintiffs request that the defendant route the calls to the plaintiffs
home. 183 The defendant asserted that the company "was its customer, not
the [plaintiff].' 8 4
The plaintiff brought suit alleging several causes of action, including
conversion of the telephone number. 18 5 The defendant demurred, and the
court sustained the defendant's motion. 186 The plaintiff appealed; however,
the appellate court rejected the plaintiffs arguments, holding that the facts
did not support an action for conversion.
1 87
In reaching this holding, the court relied on the fact that "[a]
telephone number itself is not tangible property."'18 8 The court did consider
that various tangible items, such as a bill, might raise the issue of intangible
property merging into tangible property. 189 However, this consideration
was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of conversion. 9 ° While
tangible documents did reflect the phone number, these documents did "not
represent an intangible property interest of value."' 191 In other words, theft
of these documents did not cause the owner to lose his phone number. 
192
The court also stated that any missed telephone calls were not a
proper basis for liability based on conversion. 193 The key to reaching this
conclusion was that the court could not calculate or approximate a value for
these calls. 
94
Rotstein does not place an obstacle in Gary Kremen's quest to expand
conversion law. The initial similarity between the two cases arises because
a domain name is a means of connecting to a location, just like a telephone
number. In addition, Kremen obtained his domain name via both
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Rotstein, 2002 WL 691458, at *1.
185. See id.
186. See id. at *2.
187. See id. at *2, *5.
188. Id. at *6.
189. Id.
190. See Rotstein, 2002 WL 691458, at *6.
191. Id.
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. See id.
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"electronic and registered mail to Network Solutions, Inc ... ,195 Thus,
there was a tangible representation of his intangible intellectual property,
like the telephone number in Rotstein.'96 Unlike the tangible representation
in Rotstein, the theft of Kremen's registered or electronic mail would rob
him of "an intangible property interest of value."'1 97  The theft would
prevent the domain name registration from occurring. In addition, the thief
would hold the name in his hands, as well as the opportunity to register it.
Furthermore, people could still contact Rotstein even without using a phone
number. They could send him a letter or simply speak to him in person.
Kremen, on the other hand, lost the only method for people to reach his
business. People had no means of accessing Kremen's website via their
internet browsers.
Arguably, this scenario for the plaintiff in Rotstein presents the same
result of inaccessibility to one's business by different means employed by
Stephen Cohen. Essentially, Cohen's fraudulent letter of Kremen's
relinquishment of the domain name destroyed the property interest Kremen
originally created by registering the name. Since Kremen had yet to
develop the content of his proposed website, these registration documents
may have been the only representation of the valuable commodity of
"'sex.com."
Another significant difference between Rotstein and Kremen is that
Kremen's commodity could be valued, 98 unlike the telephone number in
Rotstein.199 As such, Kremen may avoid the concern the Rotstein court
raised about telephone numbers being an improper basis for liability in
considering the expansion of the tort of conversion.200 Furthermore, a
domain name owner cannot regain the value of his property simply upon its
return, unlike a telephone number. Stephen Cohen's creation of an adult
content site attaches both a stigma and reputation to the site. Few web
surfers previously looking for Kremen's health conscious site would ever
return. The majority of hits would most likely be previous viewers of
Cohen's site returning for more. Therefore, a domain name satisfies all the
points set forth in Rotstein in favor of expanding conversion, while steering
clear from the issues that kept the Rotstein court from doing such.
195. Cohen v. Carreon, No. CV-00-235-ST, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7746, at *2 (D. Or.
Mar. 9, 2001).
196. See Rotstein, 2002 WL 691458, at *6.
197. Id.
198. Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Cyberproperty and Judicial Dissonance: The Trouble with
Domain Name Classification, GEO. MASON L. REv. 183, 184 (2001) (citation omitted).
199. Rotstein, 2002 WL 691458, at *6.
200. See id. at *5-*6
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C. Addressing the Policy Concerns of Kremen
The Kremen court cited, without developing, expanding, or
responding to, the precise policy arguments previously raised in Moore v.
Regents of the University of California.20 1 There, plaintiff John Moore
similarly brought a cause of action for conversion against The Regents of
the University of California, as well as several other defendants.2 °2
However, intellectual property was not at issue. Instead, Moore claimed
that the defendants converted his own cells and the rights to them.20 3
Moore suffered from hairy-cell leukemia and, as a result, sought
treatment at the University of California Medical Center at Los Angeles.
2 4
The doctors at the facility, also named defendants, first diagnosed Moore
based on samples of "blood, bone marrow aspirate, and other bodily
substances ....,205 Simultaneously, the doctors were considering the vast
economic gains in certain specific types of blood and blood
characteristics.
206
During Moore's treatment, one doctor determined that he should
extract Moore's spleen.20 7 The doctor convinced Moore that this operation
was essential to the preservation of Moore's health.20 8 As a result, Moore
consented to the operation.20 9
Following the operation, one of the doctors excised pieces of the
spleen in the interest of research, rather than Moore's diagnosis and
2 211treatment.2 10 The doctors never brought this to the attention of Moore.
Moore's supposed treatment continued at the medical facility.2 12 The
same doctors sampled more blood, sperm, and other bodily substances
under the guise of treatment, while continuing to seek a profitable patent.
2 13
Subsequently, the doctors created a patentable cell line based on the
research of Moore and his cells. 2 14 Experts in the field valued the cell line
201. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
202. Id. at 480.
203. Id. at 487.
204. Id. at 480.
205. Id. at 481.
206. Id. at 481.
207. Moore, 793 P.2d at 48 1.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481-82.
214. Id.
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at an estimated $3.01 billion dollars.21 5 In fact, the doctors profitted from
an agreement with Genetics Institute for the "'exclusive access to the
materials and research performed on the cell line and products derived from
it."
2 16
Moore argued that the doctors committed conversion because he
owned his cells and the right to decide how a doctor would use them.217 In
addition, Moore did not consent to the doctors' research; the doctors never
informed Moore of their intent.218 Moore alleged that he had an interest in
the profitable developments from his cells.
219
The court, however, failed to agree with Moore. 220 Like the Kremen
court, the court in Moore was hesitant to expand the tort of conversion.
22'
Similarly, the Moore court raised the same concern as the Kremen court,
that expanding the tort would impose an affirmative duty upon those
wishing to use the property to determine whether an owner consensually
relinquished his property rights.222 Additionally, the Moore court, like that
in Kremen, expressed that its hesitance correlated with the complexity of
the involved policies-topics possibly more suitable for legislative
determination.223
While the decision in Moore ultimately rested on entirely different
property issues and statutes, the court set forth the identical policy concerns
that the Kremen court relied on years later.224 However, unlike the opinion
in Kremen, the Moore opinion addressed these policy concerns in a dissent
by Justice Broussard.225 While Justice Broussard spoke directly to the issue
of human tissues and cells, 226 the principles he developed are applicable to
domain names as well.
First, Broussard attacked the majority's position that the expansion of
the tort of conversion would cause a chilling effect on medical research.227
The Kremen court similarly opined that if the tort of conversion were
expanded to include conversion of a domain name, the threat of litigation
215. Id. at 482.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 487.
218. Id.
219. Moore, 793 P.2d at 487.
220. Id. at 497.
221. Id. at 487.
222. Id. at 487 & n.16
223. Id. at 488; Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1173.
224. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 488-93. See discussion supra Part IV.
225. Moore, 793 P.2d at 504-06 (Broussard, J. concurring and dissenting).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 504.
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would slow the entire process of registration to a grinding pace. 8 Domain
name registrants would have to locate acceptable domain names and spend
increasing amounts of money and time, like the researchers, just to comply
229with regulations and find an original domain name.
Broussard dismantled this first policy argument, stating that granting
summary judgment against a plaintiff who alleges conversion is unjustified
treatment of direct interference or misappropriation with the "right to
control the use" of his property.230 According to Broussard, the argument
is valid only towards those who obtain materials from a proper cell bank.231
Similarly, the Kremen court failed to distinguish between those that
obtain their domain name through appropriate registration rather than
inappropriate interference.
As a result, an alternative remedy may not always be available to a
given plaintiff.232 In Moore, the alternative remedy of breach of fiduciary
duty would not necessarily give the plaintiff a remedy in all situations.233
For example, that remedy would only be available against the first party to
have access to the materials.234 However, if a subsequent party then stole
the materials from the first party, the original owner and donee to the first
party would be left without a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action.
23 5
Thus, the original owner would need a conversion cause of action or he
would be left without any remedy.
236
The analysis in Kremen possesses similar flaws. Here the alternative
237to conversion, as a cause of action, would be trademark infringement.
However, trademark law does not necessarily protect the rights to a domain
name.2 3 8 The United States Patent and Trademark Office sets the scope of
trademark protections. 239  According to the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, "a domain name cannot be registered as a trademark if it
functions as 'merely an informational indication of the domain name
228. See Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
229. Id.
230. Moore, 793 P.2d at 504 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
231. Id..
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id
236. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 504 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
237. See Eric G. Begun, Even Courts Aren't Sure: Domain Name: Property? Contract?,
N.J. LAW., Sept. 10, 2001, at 7.
238. See id.
239. See id.
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address used to access a website.' ''240  This guideline would leave the
domain names of greatest potential worth without trademark rights.241 This
vulnerability results because generic terms are the most valuable
commodities, as domain names, on the Internet.242 For example, websites
that contain generic terms, like sex.com, are the easiest to remember for the
Internet user, and, thus, are highly coveted.243 Unfortunately, the United
States Patent and Trademark Office refuses to allow potential registrants of
these generic names to register them as trademarks. 244 Therefore, a future
plaintiff who suffers interference with his domain name (and his rights)
will be without access to a trademark infringement cause of action.
Broussard further argued that the policy, which involves the fear of
chilling the activities of researchers, is unrealistic. 245 In Broussard's eyes,
researchers can alleviate their fears simply by going to authorized cell
24repositories. 46 These repositories only house materials that are removed
subject to patient consent.247 Thus, an action for conversion will not lie
against researchers using the repositories' services.248
The regulations likely to come as a result of the expansion of
conversion to include domain names would lead to an identical result of
greater scrutinizing of domain name registration through a different route.
Faced with the fear of conversion liability, registration organizations like
Network Solutions would take greater care when officiating the registration
process. This increased care would translate to an increase in properly
registered domain names. In addition, increased care would provide for
increased proper domain name relinquishment. If a new registrant sought a
specific name, a more organized system would make sure that the name
had no prior owners. To acquire this certainty, the previous owner should
be contacted to confirm he relinquished a previously registered name-a
gross oversight by Network Solutions in Kremen. Network Solutions is the
party with the greatest resources to take on the task of organizing and
overseeing the domain names. The expansion of the conversion doctrine
would not only place the burden of such tasks upon the proper party, but
also motivate Network Solutions with enough incentive to carry the burden.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See Begun, supra note 237, at 7.
244. See id.
245. Moore, 793 P.2d at 504 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
246. Id. at 504-05.
247. Id. at 504.
248. Id.
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Broussard's second point of contention was that, although some
parties may face liability for conversion, they will still have sufficient
reasons to continue conducting research. 49 Specifically, the prospect of
financial rewards for innovative research will prompt scientists to continue
their experiments and tests.2 50  Further, since the real value is in the
scientists' work product, not the patient's bodily substances, a patient will
only have access to diminished and limited damages.25 This result follows
from the tort law principle that "a 'subsequent innocent converter' does not
forfeit the proceeds of his own creative efforts, but rather 'is entitled to the
benefit of any work or labor that he has expended on the
[property] ....,,252
Broussard's criticism is even more compelling when applied to the
facts of Kremen. Because the website was valued at an estimated $100
million, it is unlikely that potential registrants will be deterred. 53
However, a domain name is analogous to the undeveloped bodily
substances of a patient.254 As such, a court cannot approximate the value of
the domain name until the website has content.255 For example, the $100
million approximation in Kremen followed as a result of the 25,000,000
hits a day that the X-rated website operated by Cohen received.256
Therefore, had Cohen committed the alleged conversion in good-faith,
Kremen would not have been entitled to the full $100 million. Instead,
Cohen would have kept the returns from his creation. Following this
reasoning, only those who willfully convert a domain name will lose their
profits in order to deter others from the same culpable conduct.
Justice Mosk's dissent in Moore rounds out the critique of the policy
arguments. First, Mosk criticized the argument that any decision about
expanding the tort of conversion should be left in the proper hands of the
257Legislature. He pointed out that the common law created the tort of
conversion.258 Mosk also reminded the majority that one of the greatest
aspects of the common law is its ability to adapt to changing societal
demands. 259 Tort precedent contains numerous examples of such change
249. Id. at 505.
250. Id.
251. Moore, 793 P.2d at 505 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
252. Id. (quoting 1 HARPER ET. AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 234, at 234 (2d ed. 1986)).
253. See Sex.com Site Awarded, supra note 4.
254. See Begun, supra note 237, at 7.
255. See Sex. com Awarded, supra note 4.
256. See id.
257. Moore, 793 P.2d at 507 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
258. See id.
259. Id.
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and expansion.26 °
Kremen and domain names in general could not be any better
indicators of changing societal demands. The Internet continues to grow
and attract both entrepreneurs and consumers. Many people flock to cyber
dressing rooms, bookstores, and libraries in search of products and
information instead of the tangible storefronts so coveted by the judicial
system. The common law can, and should, follow the people to protect
their venturing into new avenues, even super-highways. It must provide
the incentive for proper business and economic growth, as well as
consumer interest, while deterring those eager to employ culpable conduct
for their own gain.
D. Even Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court Judges
Want "Sex "-Sex.com, That Is
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit attempted to
address the challenging and important questions that Judge Ware left
unanswered. The Ninth Circuit heard Gary Kremen's appeal. 26' However,
the Ninth Circuit posed only questions, not answers, in its decision to order
the matter certified to the Supreme Court of California.262 The questions
offered up to the Supreme Court of California were as follows:
Is an Internet domain name within the scope of property subject
to the tort of conversion? (a) For the tort of conversion to apply
to intangible property, is it necessary that the intangible property
be merged with a document or other tangible medium? (b) If
the answer to Question (a) is "yes," does the tort of conversion
apply to an Internet domain name, or, more specifically, is an
Internet domain name merged with a document or other tangible
medium?
263
The Ninth Circuit chose to certify the question because of the value
that an answer could have on both precedent and public policy.
264
California has yet to answer these questions under its state conversion
laws.265 Further, the Internet is the means by which all members of varying
social and economic classes may access the world in order to exercise their
First Amendment rights. With the ever-growing number of domain names
260. See id.
261. Kremen v. Cohen, 314 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2003).
262. See id. at 1129.
263. Id. at 1130.
264. See id. at 1132-36.
265. Id.
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and the importance of the Internet as a means of communication and
business, 266 those questions can wait no longer to be answered. While
Judge Kozinski did correctly point out in his dissent that certifying the
question will tax the California Supreme Court's already sparse resources
of time and money,267 Kozinski incorrectly believes that "[c]yberspace will
not implode if the supreme court confronts the majority's questions at some
point in the future. ,,26 Carefully making the "lawyerly" choice to use
the word implosion does make the result seem unlikely; however, the
results of exponential increases in culpable conduct, such as that engaged
in by Cohen, as well as exponential increases in suits to remedy this
conduct, hardly seem to spare administrative costs or Internet development.
In essence, the choice would subsidize Network Solutions by allowing it to
expend absolutely no resources to better its registration system. Network
Solutions must be held accountable in order for it to recognize its
responsibility to protect all domain name registrants. Network Solutions
has yet to take on this role, as evidenced by its decision to tell Cohen to
contact Kremen, rather than contacting Kremen itself, thus creating the
entire problem.269 In addition, Kremen should hardly be expected to be left
to seek recourse from Cohen, a virtual fugitive from justice.
Kozinski does state that the Ninth Circuit can answer these questions,
which would still leave the Supreme Court of California with the option to
overrule.270  Nevertheless, that point seems to undermine Kozinski's
judicial resource argument. Essentially, two different courts would then
exhaust their resources while handling the same question. Furthermore, the
delay created by Kozinski's dual resource expenditure could also lead to
more litigation by other parties. The time has come for the judicial system
to embrace the same technology consumers and businessmen have utilized
for years.
266. Id.
267. See Kremen, 314 F.3d at 1136.
268. Id.
269. See id. at 1137 n.2.
270. See generally id. at 1142-45 (discussing the alternatives to certifying the question for
Supreme Court hearing).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Kremen court improperly decided to preserve the common law
limitations on the types of property protected by conversion law. The
established elements of the tort of conversion do not reflect the seemingly
never-ending advancements in technology in recent years. The Rotstein
court best explained this idea when it stated, "[a]s society became
technologically more advanced, the value of intangible property rights
became apparent and consequently subject to theft.,
271
The current limits on tort protection do not address the concerns of
either entrepreneurs or consumers. First, the limitations are incompatible
with the modem entrepreneur's aggressive investment in the Internet.
Large corporations and mom-and-pop stores alike seek daily to expand
their clientele by making their businesses and products accessible on the
Internet. Without the legal protection of conversion, "[e]ven if [an
entrepreneur] is successful in regaining control of the domain name, there
is nothing to prevent another person from hijacking the site using the same
procedure. 272  Second, unrecognized conversions of domain names
potentially hurt consumers as well.273 Consumers have shown a strong
interest in e-business.274 However, the only way to satisfy their interest is
via domain names. 275 One cannot physically drive to these cyberstores on
the Information Super Highway.
276
The California Supreme Court now has the opportunity to provide
registration organizations with the incentive to run an efficient and secure
registration process. Similarly, expanding the protections afforded to
potential registrants will provide them with incentive to delve into the
Internet. Finally, the expansion will provide individuals like Stephen
Cohen with sufficient disincentive to engage in domain name theft and
fraudulent conduct. These are the desired results, as it is the wrongdoers
like Cohen who should suffer. Furthermore, parties like Network
Solutions, Inc., who sit in the best position to stop these incidents from
occurring, must be held accountable so that they take advantage of their
271. Rotstein v. Cable & Wireless, Inc., No. G027549, 2002 WL 691458, at *5 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 24, 2002).
272. NSI Wins Another One, 5 CYBERSPACE LAW. 27, July/Aug. 2000, LEXIS, News &
Business, News, News Group File, All.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See generally Yee, supra note 8, at 206-07 (recognizing that although domain names
have the potential to make or break a business, competition for domain names is cutthroat).
276. See generally id. at 203 (comparing domain names to real estate addresses).
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position. As such, the California Supreme Court must expand the tort of
conversion to include domain names within the protections afforded to
other forms of intangible property.
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